Reducing the power gap
In May this year, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly supported a Palestinian bid to become a full UN member. It recognised it as qualified to join and recommended the UN Security Council to "reconsider the matter favourably."
On that occasion, the Assembly adopted the resolution with 143 votes in favour and nine against - among them the US and Israel – while 24 abstained, most of them fearing Washinton's wrath. To be sure, the UN Security Council has voted, as late as April this year, in support of Palestinian statehood, and not for the first time, with a majority of 12, while two abstained (the UK and Switzerland), and it is not exactly a top secret that these two countries support a two-state solution but for their reasons decided to sit on the fence.
However, since the US, which has the veto power, was the country to oppose this resolution, it didn't pass, something which, over the years, has become a matter of routine, and by that, prevented the only global political body with the power to bestow such recognition from doing so.
Litany of Washinton’s contradictions
In the litany of Washington's contradictions regarding the Israeli–Palestinian issue, the repeated vetoing of Palestinian statehood is one of the most bewildering, especially as its most senior foreign policy decision-makers, including President Joe Biden, are consistently expressing their support for a two-state solution, the logical conclusion of which is an independent Palestinian state. It is especially bemusing as years of right-led Israeli governments through their settlement policies and entrenching the occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories have made the possibility of a territorially contiguous Palestinian state impossible. And, since the sixth Netanyahu government was formed in early 2023, one that is dominated by far-right messianic-religious elements, the direction is of expanding settlements and increased settler violence against Palestinians with complete impunity, while some leading figures in the government openly state their intention of annexing the West Bank in its entirety. Moreover, following the war which broke out on October 7, there are suggestions among senior members of the Israeli cabinet to re-occupy and build settlements in the the Gaza Strip.
“Following the war which broke out on October 7, there are suggestions among senior members of the Israeli cabinet to re-occupy and build settlements in the the Gaza Strip.”
Despite these developments that have changed the political and physical terrain of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US approach, and for many years also most European countries, that recognising Palestinian statehood shouldn't take place prior to a peace agreement with Israel remained intact.
Yet, this mainly highlighted their isolation in this regard, as there is broad international support for such a recognition, and in the case of Europe, there is an intrinsic contradiction of many of them between their support of admitting Palestine to the UN as a sovereign state but not recognising it individually. Moreover it brought to the fore the question of whether recognition would accelerate peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, would slow it down, or would make no difference. In Europe the discourse around this question is rapidly changing, much of it because of the war in Gaza, and Spain was leading a partially successful move to recognise Palestinian statehood, recently affirmed by the European Union's foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on the sidelines of a World Economic Forum special meeting in Riyadh. Mr Borrell rejected the notion that, at this time, recognising Palestinian statehood is a prize to Hamas, stating that "Recognising the Palestinian state is not a gift to Hamas, quite the contrary. Reinforcing the Palestinian Authority is not reinforcing Hamas; quite the contrary. It's aimed at giving greater strength to the part of Palestinian society which we recognize and with which we work."
"Recognising the Palestinian state is not a gift to Hamas, quite the contrary. Reinforcing the Palestinian Authority is not reinforcing Hamas; quite the contrary. It's aimed at giving greater strength to the part of Palestinian society which we recognize and with which we work." [Josep Borrell]
It can be argued that the question of recognising Palestinian statehood has been overtaken by events and it is already a state, therefore UNSC recognition is no more than a formality. It has governing bodies of sorts, its pre-June 1967 borders are generally speaking internationally recognised, and even Israel during previous peace negotiations accepted that these borders are the benchmark for a two-state solution, even if the final borders between Israel and Palestine are not going identical to the pre-June 1967, swop of land will compensate for moving territory taken by Jewish settlements.
Additionally, Palestine already has a formal status in the family of nations, as it was accepted as a non-member observer state of the UN General Assembly in November of 2012 by a vote supported by 138 countries and opposed by only nine member states. The recent vote in the General Assembly has mainly reiterated the broad support in Palestinian statehood. In many countries Palestinian diplomatic delegations are treated on equal footing with embassies, and 11 of the 27 EU members have already recognised Palestine as a state, as have most African, Asian and Latin American countries. It is, in particular, significant that over the last few months, as a result of the war in Gaza, Spain, Norway, Ireland and later Slovenia joined seven other countries that had already recognised Palestinian statehood, creating in the EU a powerful bloc that lobbies for the institution as a whole to follow suit. In practical terms it can be argued that this leaves the question of whether a formal UNSC recognition is just symbolic, as important as it might be.
Departure from current situation
Whatever merit there is to claim that recognition of Palestinian statehood would be merely gestural, the more persuasive argument is that it would mean a substantial departure from the current situation, which disadvantages not only the Palestinians but also the cause of peace itself, because of the very asymmetric nature in this conflict between the two main protagonists, which by itself is a hindrance to peace. Recognising Palestine would mitigate some of this asymmetry and create a different dynamic in relations between the Palestinians and Israel and, with it, the general international approach to the nature of the negotiations.
“Recognising Palestine would mitigate some of this asymmetry and create a different dynamic in relations between the Palestinians and Israel.”
There is a marked difference in relations, especially in the context of negotiations, between one side which is a recognised state, a well-established one with a powerful military and economy, with all the symbols of one, let alone territorial integrity and recognised borders. At the same time, the other is an entity that is mostly under harsh occupation, and currently, part of its territory in Gaza is devastated, and tens of thousands of its people have been killed in the war. The population that survived the war suffers from severe trauma and whose security and economy are at the mercy of the occupier.
Tool for pressure
Moreover, many of those the PLO, the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, represent, live in the diaspora; it puts the Palestinians at a severe disadvantage, while international recognition could significantly reduce the power gap between the two. At present, recognition, or more accurately preventing such recognition, is a tool abused by Israel to pressure the Palestinians into making concessions. For Palestinians, recognition should revive their appetite for a negotiated agreement, will serve as an incentive to unite and reform their system of governance, and equally significantly, transform their discourse from that of a liberation movement, including an armed struggle, to one that operates as a state with the responsibility for the security and wellbeing of all its people.
Past and present Israeli administrations, including those that supported the Oslo Accords and peace initiatives since then, have opposed recognising Palestine as a state because this would deprive the former of a key pressure point on the Palestinians, and, as during the Netanyahu years, as part of a deliberate strategy of thwarting a peace agreement based on a two-state solution. For the international community, to present Israel with Palestinian statehood as a fait accompli would be to send a clear signal of intent and force Israel to accept it or find itself isolated.
“For the international community, to present Israel with Palestinian statehood as a fait accompli would be to send a clear signal of intent and force Israel to accept it or find itself isolated.”
It is far from guaranteed that Israel will draw the right conclusions from the traumatic experiences post-October 7, but one of these lessons, among many others, must be that preventing Palestinian statehood through meddling in Palestinian affairs only empowers the more extreme segments in the Palestinian polity who are least conducive to living peacefully side by side with a Jewish state.
To be sure, decades of delay over recognising Palestinian statehood have not advanced by one iota the cause of peace negotiations, let alone a peace agreement, and instead contributed to the constant deterioration in security, not to mention the horrific war in Gaza, following the atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7. By now, it is clear, including to those who genuinely believed that recognising Palestinian statehood is an incentive for Palestinians not to make the necessary concession for a peace agreement based on a two-state solution, that it has become a bottleneck and a distraction that has prevented the sides from progressing on other outstanding issues between them.
“It is far from guaranteed that Israel will draw the right conclusions from the traumatic experiences post-October 7, but one of these lessons must be that preventing Palestinian statehood through meddling in Palestinian affairs only empowers the more extreme segments in the Palestinian polity.”
In truth, there is certainly the danger that one or both sides might draw the wrong conclusions if such recognition becomes a reality, through either more countries recognise it individually, the EU as a whole adopt this approach, or in the unlikely event that the US removes its veto in the UNSC and let such a resolution to pass. Israel, due to its entrenched distrust of the international community, would probably see it as another premeditated move to undermine its security and its survival; while the Palestinians might conclude that the tide has turned in their favour and against Israel, feel that there is no urgency to conclude a peace agreement, and consequently harden their position. If that were the case, it would be for the international community to ensure that this thinking is instantly eliminated.
If there is anything to learn from the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian tragedy that got out of control over the last few months, it is that leaving the Israeli–Palestinian unresolved could only end in war and bloodshed. Consequently, the domestic and international discourse over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has changed dramatically, highlighting the understanding that avoiding any proactive approach to resolving it comes at an intolerable price whose impact goes well beyond Israel and Palestine. For now, it is impossible to envisage Washington leading a radical change to this intractable conflict, especially in an election year. Hence, it makes it imperative that the EU, both for individual member states and as one of the more powerful and influential political bodies in international affairs, which has deep-rooted interests in the region and its stability, not to mention its historical connections, takes the lead and the initiative in recognising Palestine as a state.
A two-state solution in a one-state reality
This will send a clear message to Washington that America either joins Europe in recognition or remains almost isolated from its friends by not doing so. Eventually, the Netanyahu era will come to an end, and there are strong signs that this might end sooner rather than later. A new Israeli government will have then to form its policies towards a sovereign Palestinian state based on equal standing in international law and among the international community.
“It makes it imperative that the EU as one of the more powerful and influential political bodies in international affairs, which has deep-rooted interests in the region and its stability, not to mention its historical connections, takes the lead and the initiative in recognising Palestine as a state.”
It will then remain to be seen how it will affect negotiations, but the working assumption is that a two-state solution remains the most viable peaceful option for this conflict, which considering the small territory and population density, should aim to leave open borders for political, economic and social activities. In other words, a two-state solution in a one-state reality.
Simply recognising Palestine as a state will not be the complete panacea, but it will be the essential, crucial turning point towards a just and viable resolution to one of the most protracted and volatile conflicts in modern history.
© Qantara.de 2024
Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the Middle East and North Africa Program at international affairs think tank Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg