Thanks to the pall cast by the war in Ukraine, the international community has resigned itself to a conflict that is both costly and consequential for Germany: the crisis in and around Syria. Year on year, Berlin contributes a billion euros to the United Nations aid programme for Syria, but Syrians still make up the majority of Germany’s first-time asylum applicants. The fact that the Syrian people are worse off than ever before should be a wake-up call for those in a position to act.

The situation is catastrophic: ninety percent of the population lives in poverty, while inflation and rising prices add to their hardship. 14.6 million people are dependent on humanitarian aid; seven million internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in draughty tents and temporary shelters. Fear is their daily bread: depending on the region, people either dread the secret services of ruler Bashar al-Assad, extremist militias, another Turkish invasion, or the return of Islamic State (IS).

With Turkey seeking to send one million Syrian refugees back to northern Syria and Europe debating when it will be safe enough to begin deportations to Syria, the only thing troubling those on the ground is how to escape the squalor. Thus, the question is not when exiled Syrians will finally be able to return, but how conditions in the country can be improved so that those who are still there stay put.

Prerequisite to this is the honest realisation that the Syrian conflict is not going to be solved in the next few years. Assad continues to rule as before; his opponents have fled, been defeated or discredited. Assad’s dependence on others means that although his power is not stable, it is viable. Those profiting from his system live off Western-funded UN aid, the trade in synthetic drugs and the foreign exchange revenue that Syrian embassies in Europe collect through passport fees.

File photo: Camp in Ma'arrat Misrin, 2020 (photo: picture-alliance/dpa/Al-Kharboutli) — Syria's humanitarian situation is catastrophic: ninety percent of the population lives in poverty, while inflation and rising prices add to their hardship. 14.6 million people are dependent on humanitarian aid; seven million internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in draughty tents and temporary shelters. Fear is their daily bread: depending on the region, people either dread the secret services of ruler Bashar al-Assad, extremist militias, another Turkish invasion, or the return of Islamic State (IS)

Things are going well for Assad

Things are also going well for Assad in the region; relations with his Arab neighbours are visibly thawing. State visits, ministerial meetings and the re-opening of embassies in Damascus are driving the rehabilitation of the Syrian regime forward – despite all the ongoing violations of international law. The rationale is simple: since Assad is unlikely to step down any time soon, it would be better to welcome him back into the Arab fold, rather than abandon Syria to be influenced by Iran, Russia and Turkey.

How should Europe deal with this entrenched conflict in its direct vicinity? There is obviously no question of negotiating with the war’s profiteers because of their crimes. So how can the crisis be managed in such a way as to alleviate the plight of Syrians without strengthening the Assad regime?

The key lies in the geographical division of the country. The lines of conflict have been largely frozen since the spring of 2020, with Syria disintegrating into four zones of influence. Assad controls the highly populated areas in the centre, along the coast and to the south. The northeast – almost a third of Syria's territory – is ruled by the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES). The last region held by Assad opponents in the north-western province of Idlib is ruled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an alliance of extremist militias. Ankara has secured the Turkish-occupied areas along the northern border using Syrian mercenaries, while installing opposition members as governors.

Different realities have developed in each of these areas, each requiring its own response from the international community. The aim should not be to cement divisions, but to improve living conditions for people on the ground and manage intra-Syrian exchanges between the four regions more effectively.

Trade and smuggling already takes place across the frontlines – oil and agricultural products, goods from Turkey, weapons, drugs and people. Yet this war economy only serves to benefit armed groups, intelligence agents in the various regions and businessmen close to Assad who, rather than providing for local residents, prefer to line their own pockets. A nationwide network of checkpoints ensures them arbitrary access to anything of value, while the local population is forced to endure constantly rising prices and new regulations.

The need for pragmatism

If foreign donors could grasp that Syria is a temporarily divided country and find an effective way of dealing with the various regional rulers, negotiations could get underway – not on political issues such as democracy, co-determination and calling criminals to account, but on the practical problems of everyday life that make Syrians' lives difficult without regulated co-operation: the availability of oil and cooking gas, the distribution of vegetables and fruit, electricity and water supplies, the recognition of school-leaving qualifications and medical care.

Supporters of the Islamist HTS wave their flags in Idlib (photo: Omar Hajj Kaddour/Getty Images/AFP) — Idlib is governed by the Islamist HTS: international donors have largely withdrawn and only fund NGOs that can prove that no money ends up with HTS. “This has put local organisations under extreme pressure,” writes Kristin Helberg. “They are supposed to alleviate the growing need, require the Salvation Government's approval for their work, but only receive money from abroad if they are independent of HTS”

Conflict consultant Malik al-Abdeh and political scientist Lars Hauch from the London-based consultancy Conflict Mediation Solutions are staunch advocates of such pragmatism. They argue that in order to improve trade and the freedom of movement of people within Syria, the various powers – the Assad regime, HTS, Turkish-backed opposition and AANES – need to consider themselves equal in the short term and negotiate technical details.

In doing so, like should only be exchanged for like, for example by both sides dismantling roadblocks or customs duties, facilitating the transport of goods and travel, or mutually recognising school-leaving qualifications. Al-Abdeh and Hauch write that under no circumstances should one-time gestures of goodwill such as the release of prisoners be allowed to lead to structural changes such as the lifting of sanctions; they denounce the UN's step-by-step approach towards Damascus to date.

The two authors are convinced that better regulated contacts between the different Syrian zones of influence could help counteract state collapse and lay the foundations for a political settlement in the long term. Such "crossline deals" are therefore also in the interest of the international community. They should be supported by the UN, backed by guarantees from the intervention powers and negotiated by the Syrian conflict parties in direct talks, al-Abdeh and Hauch urge.

There is no need for Europe and the United States to legitimise the respective rulers. They simply need to make it very clear who is in the driver's seat – namely themselves, since they are financing 80 percent of the humanitarian aid and must therefore ensure that the money goes to those most in need – wherever they are in Syria. Instead of playing the cash cow and throwing billions into the UN pot year after year, from which Assad can help himself at will, Europe needs to turn its economic power into negotiating capital.

Assad exploits international aid

"Rescuing Aid in Syria", a report written by American scholar Natasha Hall for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, describes how ineffective and corrupt the international aid rendered to Syria is. The details, though shocking, are nothing new; after all, the Assad regime has been using humanitarian aid for years as a tool to maintain its own grip on power.

Emergency shelter in Idlib (photo: AFP/A.Watad) — The Syrian people need international aid, but this is organised in such a way that it plays into Assad's hands, reports “Rescuing Aid in Syria” written by American scholar Natasha Hall. The details are shocking: the Assad regime has been using humanitarian aid for years as a tool to maintain its own grip on power. Manipulation begins with the artificially low exchange rate applied to the UN when buying Syrian pounds. Fifty-one cents per dollar – more than half of the financial aid – is siphoned off by the Syrian central bank as foreign exchange reserves. The rest is passed by the UN agencies to Syrian partner organisations belonging to Assad's circle of power, either close to the security apparatus or the military, or linked to the regime

Manipulation begins with the artificially low exchange rate applied to the UN when buying Syrian pounds. As a result, 51 cents per dollar – more than half of the financial aid – is siphoned off by the Syrian central bank as foreign exchange reserves. The rest is passed by the UN agencies to Syrian partner organisations belonging to Assad's circle of power, either close to the security apparatus or the military, or linked to the regime. The UN doesn’t seem to care that many of these partners are on the EU and USA sanctions list – the main thing is that permits are issued quickly and the work continues.

Donors like Germany and the EU would therefore need to make their support for regime areas subject to concrete conditions or recipients. Were European taxpayers' money to continue to end up with those who were sanctioned for good reason, aid would have to be withheld.

This would increase the pressure on the UN to stop submitting to the Assad regime's dictates and to spend the billions in line with humanitarian criteria. The sub-organisations would have to act collectively, exchange regime-friendly personnel, draft independent requirement plans and implement them. If the regime refused to agree, disbursement of the funds would be suspended for the time being. Carrot and stick – there is no other way.

Reorienting UN aid in this way would not only provide better care for people in areas under the regime, but it would also have to ensure that the northeast received the support it needed. Ever since Russia's veto in the UN Security Council closed the Syrian-Iraqi border crossing Al-Yaroubia in early 2020, all UN aid to north-eastern Syria has had to go through Damascus. The UN is not allowed to engage directly with the self-governing authorities. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are trying to fill the gaps that have arisen, but healthcare in particular is suffering.

During the coronavirus pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) neither delivered the necessary test material nor the corresponding vaccine doses, because Damascus refused to grant permission. If the WHO continues to abandon the three million people in north-eastern Syria out of deference to the Assad regime, international donors will need to look for local partners.

The division of Syria as of 23.05.2022 (source: Janes Conflict Monitor/DW) — Frozen lines of conflict: since spring 2020, Syria has disintegrated into four zones of influence. Assad controls the highly populated areas in the centre, along the coast and to the south. The north-east – almost a third of Syria's territory – is ruled by the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES). The last region held by Assad opponents in the north-western province of Idlib is ruled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an alliance of extremist militias. Ankara has secured the Turkish-occupied areas along the northern border using Syrian mercenaries, while installing opposition members as governors

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Kurdish autonomy project represents an opportunity

The Kurdish AANES areas are well placed in this respect, as more than 200 NGOs are able to operate relatively freely there. Cautious countries like Germany – fearful of Turkey's displeasure because the latter labels the autonomy project "terrorist", fighting it because of its links to the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) – could help as well, because they wouldn't have to cooperate directly with AANES. The health system could be supported by the Kurdish Red Crescent, an independent organisation in receipt of money from Europe and the USA for years.

The development of the region is important in countering the resurgence of Islamic State (IS), which has been successfully recruiting from among the relatives of former IS fighters and the impoverished population in the provinces of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor. Much of the agricultural land is unusable due to years of drought. This is further exacerbated by Turkey taking more water from the upper reaches of the Euphrates than it is allowed to under the terms of a pre-existing agreement – indeed, water levels have never been so low.

Investment in infrastructure and agriculture is therefore all the more urgent – a fact recognised by the USA. In April 2022 it lifted its Syria sanctions for the northeast in the hope of encouraging private companies and other governments to become more involved. Europe should seize this opportunity to initiate more sustainable development in at least one third of Syria's territory, making the inhabitants independent of humanitarian aid in the long term.

What remains is the struggle to provide for the four million people in Idlib province. The majority of them are internally displaced persons forced to flee from the regime several times over the course of the war, who have been living in tent cities or ruined buildings for years.

The United Nations is still allowed to supply the area in the northwest via the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. But the only remaining entry point for cross-border UN aid is threatened with closure: every six months the UN Security Council has to vote on an extension and every time Russia threatens to use its veto to channel all humanitarian aid through Damascus.

Empower NGOs in Idlib

The core problem in Idlib is the local ruler HTS, to which the former al-Qaida offshoot Nusra Front also belongs and which is regarded as a terrorist group by the international community. Since 2017, HTS has been running its own administration in the form of the "Syrian Salvation Government"; international donors have largely withdrawn and only fund NGOs that can prove that no money ends up with HTS.

This has put local organisations under extreme pressure – they are supposed to alleviate the growing need and require the Salvation Government's approval for their work, but only receive money from abroad if they are independent of HTS. Individual NGOs cannot hold their own under these circumstances, writes Natasha Hall in her study, which is why she calls for a collective approach by the international community.

Donor countries and the UN need to join forces and negotiate a clear framework with HTS for support in the northwest. This would better protect the space for humanitarian aid and limit the influence of the Salvation government, says Hall. The point is not to legitimise HTS, but to maintain the valuable work of civil society partners – in the interest of the people of Idlib.

This turnaround in dealing with Syria requires knowledge of local conditions and determination. The distribution of aid in Assad areas must be governed by UN rules, not those of the regime. The northeast should not only be supplied with humanitarian aid but also developed and stabilised with infrastructure measures. In the northwest, a coordinated approach by all donors is needed to impose conditions on HTS that allow for long-term provision for the people without strengthening the terrorist group.

If this is not achieved, the billions in aid from the West will continue to consolidate Assad's power and leave the most vulnerable people destitute. Young people will make their way to Europe or join extremist groups. If we want to prevent further refugees and an IS 2.0, we must finally ensure that the aid in Syria reaches those who need it most.

Kristin Helberg

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