Playing with fire

Observers of the political scene in Morocco cannot but see a retreat from democracy. It seems that those who hold the kind of views which have been circulating in and outside Morocco in the wake of Abdelilah Benkirane′s dismissal as head of government have not read any of the political literature about modern Morocco. Apparently, the state is determined to continue a programme of reform, albeit at its own pace and according to its own priorities, whilst adducing examples and slogans in its support such as "a new constitution, early elections, electoral neutrality" etc.
The current process of reform is no more than that of a system bent on renewing its authoritarian rule and extending its control internally, whilst at the same time enhancing its image and ensuring its acceptance internationally. After a quarter of a century of an official reform policy, this choice reflects the uncertainty which has become part of a political system trying to remain in the grey zone between a closed system and an open one.
Even the new constitutional text which was considered by many as a practical step forward in the path of democratic evolution has shown that it can be interpreted in more than one way. Thus, the "text of the constitution" for which the majority of Moroccans voted, is different from the "spirit of the constitution" which was used by supporters of authoritarian rule to establish the legitimacy of their plans as an alternative to the results of the ballot box.
Moreover, the blank spaces that were deliberately included in the text served as a way out, facilitating the suppression of the political status quo in accordance with the predetermined agenda of the "deep state".

Ignoring the demands of the Moroccan Rif
Over the past few weeks, Moroccans have become reacquainted with scenes they thought were long past, including what became known as the "Moroccan Rif Spring". For the last six months, Al-Hoceima in the north of the country has seen protests and demonstrations demanding equal job opportunities.
The return of such scenes is evidence that the "Moroccan Spring" has passed. The time has come to settle the legacy of five years of "Moroccan exceptionalism" and to rewind the clock to the status quo before the King′s address on 9 March 2011.
Little by little, the Interior Ministry has begun re-introducing security measures to control the situation, brutally intervening to stop an academic seminar on parliamentary monarchy, attended by prominent international specialists. A week later, another security intervention followed with the banning of a conference of the General Union of Moroccan Workers, which is the trade union arm of the Independence Party (Istiqlal). More interventions have followed, tainting the positive image which the security establishment had gained in the eyes of the people in recent years through its success in preventing crime and terrorism.

Parallel to this, the "deep state" is working to nullify the previous government′s achievements, most importantly with regard to the judiciary and institutional culture, areas in which that government had invested so much time in the hope of redeeming itself. The state is doing this by stopping the practice of direct employment and by wearing down public sector strikes… and much else, which also has the effect of belittling the standing of state institutions in the eyes of Moroccan citizens.
The government ignored the demands of the Rif protesters for months, before it realised that the matter was snowballing out of control. It was then forced to intervene urgently through a campaign of pardons and transfers of personnel in the territorial administration (al-Idara al-Turabiyya), ultimately sending a ministerial delegation to the region. This gave legitimacy to the demands of the street and to the nature of the protest. As a result ordinary people began to believe – yet again – that the only way to secure their basic demands was through protest.
Political parties: dropped from the equation
The implications of this hypothesis have already begun to manifest themselves in practical terms through the emergence of protest movements across Morocco, including in Taounate, Azilal and Fez, some of which have been met with force and violence. The establishment′s plan has become clear since the appointment of Othmani′s government with its specified policy which aims to achieve three goals with one strike:

First: to wipe the last head of government, Abdelilah Benkirane, from the popular consciousness. Benkirane managed to abolish the technocrat tendency which had prevailed in the new era and restore credibility to the political process.
Ordinary people had held politicians in poor esteem since the usurping of the democratic process in 2002 and Benkirane did much to redress this.
Second: to restore the reputation of the technocrats and to groom politicians from the administrative parties, making them visible as leaders who are quick on their feet, quick to engage and swift to take action.
In doing so, they are bound to exploit the subservience of much of the party political elite, which is either corrupt, opportunistic or complicit.
Third: to undermine the political process – having successfully compromised the traditional parties e.g. the Independence Party (Istiqlal) and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki lil-Quwwat al-Sha′biyya) – and to facilitate autocratic rule through partisan leaderships.
As a result the parties are kept under control, thereby avoiding any surprises at the ballot box, as happened with Benkirane, when he decided to flout convention and play outside the traditional establishment arena.
At the same time, it has become apparent that the supporters of authoritarian rule and its architects do not realise that they are playing with fire. This harsh suppression of the political process will render the political parties irrelevant and will bring the people into direct confrontation with the establishment and, specifically, with the institution of the monarchy. In short, the political parties have ceased to mediate between the people and the establishment, becoming instead the mouthpiece and a tool of the latter′s henchmen.
Mohamed Taifouri
© Qantara.de 2017
Translated from the Arabic by Chris Somes-Charlton